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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the firm value implications of sport sponsorships for sponsors may
depend on the competitive environment during the bidding process for different types of
sponsorships. More specifically, we contend that the bidding environment for professional football
(soccer) kit sponsorships represents a form of common value auction, while the bidding
environment for corporate logo sponsorships on teams’ shirts does not. As common value auctions
are prone to winner’s curse, the firm value implications should be different for kit sponsorship
announcements than for shirt sponsorship announcements. Our results suggest that shareholders
indeed perceive the value derived from kit and shirt sponsorships differently, resulting in the
predicted distinction in their impact on sponsors’ firm value. This study sheds light on conflicting
results on firm value implications of sport sponsorships in the prior literature and provides rich
areas for future research.
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A Dichotomy of Sport Sponsorships

The sport sponsorship market is substantial and growing. IEG – the industry leader in
sponsorship research – notes that the total spending by firms on all sponsorships in 2018 was
estimated to be $23.1B in North America and $62.7B worldwide. Sport sponsorships accounted
for over 75% ($17.5B) of this spending in North America and over 70% ($45.2B) worldwide. It is
not surprising then that a steady stream of recent academic research has analyzed the impact of
sport sponsorships on sponsors’ firm value (Bouchet, Doellman, Troilo, & Walkup, 2015;
Bouchet, Doellman, Troilo, & Walkup, 2017; Clark, Cornwell, & Pruitt, 2009; Cornwell, Pruitt,
& Clark, 2005; Hino & Takeda, 2020; Jensen, 2016; Jensen & Cobbs, 2014; Jensen, Cobbs, &
Turner, 2016; Mori, Morino, & Takeda, 2020).
Prior studies have analyzed a plethora of sport sponsorships, such as those involving
individual athletes, the Olympic Games, auto racing events, the Super Bowl, and international
football (commonly referred to as soccer in the United States) matches. However, the analyses of
these sponsorships have largely been conducted with little consideration for how distinct types of
sport sponsorships may be viewed differently and, therefore, valued differently by firm
stakeholders. Thus, the prior literature provides little clarity on why some sport sponsorships have
been found to be value enhancing or value neutral while others have been found to decrease firm
value. The primary objective of this paper is to shed light on this important, yet unaddressed, issue.
The value proposition of sport sponsorships to firms is best exemplified by the proportion
of total sponsorship spending going to sport sponsorships mentioned above. This value proposition
can lead to fierce competition among prospective sponsors for the right to sponsor influential
sports entities and sporting events. The most obvious source of value is the increased visibility of
the sponsoring entity’s brand during competitions that are frequently televised globally. For
instance, the 2018 championship match of the men’s FIFA World Cup, an international football
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competition held every four years in which each team represents its country, attracted a viewing
audience of more than 1.1 billion people worldwide (Richter, 2020). But the value proposition of
sport sponsorships extends far beyond visibility via media channels. Sponsors of team jerseys and
apparel can benefit directly from the purchase of such apparel by the team’s fans and indirectly by
those fans wearing that apparel in public. In 2018, Cristiano Ronaldo signed a contract valued at
€99.2 million with the Italian futbol club Juventus – whose kit rights are owned by Adidas – and

the club sold 520,000 shirts bearing his name within 24 hours. It is estimated that those purchases
translated to a tangible €60 million in sales for Adidas (Hess, 2018) and an intangible amount of
value derived from the visibility of the Adidas logo on those shirts worn by fans worldwide.
Sponsors can have much more specific strategies in mind as well. Chevrolet - an American
automobile manufacturer – invested $560 million in its sponsorship of the English football club,
Manchester United, with the stated objective of increasing it brand recognition and sales in
Southeast Asia, a region where the club enjoys a strong following (Automotive News, 2014).
While it is clear sponsors place a high value on sport sponsorships, the shareholder value
implications of acquiring these sponsorships are an entirely different story as the price paid for the
sponsorship relative to the benefits expected determines the sponsorship’s impact on firm value.
This fact motivates the growing interest in better understanding the firm value implications of sport
sponsorships. As noted above, numerous studies have attempted to shed light on this important
topic, but they have mostly ignored the fact that the amount paid for a sponsorship is impacted by
the nature of the competitive bidding process between the firms vying for the sponsorship. By
examining the competition among sponsors for different types of sponsorships, we attempt to shed
light on why the firm value implications of sport sponsorships may vary as demonstrated in the
prior literature.
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Specifically, in this paper we consider the winner’s curse theory (Capen, Clapp, and
Campbell, 1971) and how it might help explain variation in firm value implications of sport
sponsorships. This theory assumes that when entities bid against one another in an auction format,
the firm that estimates the intrinsic value of the underlying asset to be the greatest will win the
auction, as they are likely to submit the highest bid. In such a scenario, if the intrinsic value of the
asset is unknown but similar for the parties involved in the auction (known as a common value
auction), then it is increasingly likely that the winning bidder will have overpaid in the auction –
known as “the winner’s curse”. Clearly, a sport sponsorship has an unknown intrinsic value to
prospective sponsors at the time of the bidding. More importantly, we will argue that the intrinsic
value of a sport sponsorship to the prospective sponsors is similar in some instances (i.e. a common
value auction), but not in others. Thus, winner’s curse will apply to the bidding process for some
types of sponsorships and not others.
While prior studies recognize that the sponsor firm value implications are a net effect of
both the benefits received and the costs paid for the sponsorship, they have not considered that the
costs may differ based on the competitive nature of the bidding process among prospective
sponsors. This is where our study notably differentiates itself from prior studies in this literature
(see, e.g., Bouchet et al., 2015; 2017; Clark et al., 2009; Cornwell et al., 2005). The purpose of our
study is to examine the bidding process for sport sponsorships and its implications for sponsor
firm value in an attempt to deepen our understanding of prior findings in the literature and to
motivate new opportunities for future research. In addition, our results have broader appeal as the
findings are likely generalizable to non-sport related sponsorships, again motivating more
opportunities for future research.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
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Firm Value Implications of Sport Sponsorships
Sponsorship has been defined as the “provision of assistance, either financial or in-kind, to
any activity by a commercial organization for the purpose of achieving commercial objectives”
(Meenaghan 1983). Sponsorships between firms and sport properties have become an effective
vehicle for mainstream marketing communications and as a means to a sustained competitive
advantage (Amis, Pant, & Slack, 1997; Amis, Slack & Berrett, 1999; Cornwell, Weeks, and Roy
2005). This is, at least in part, because sport sponsorships have proven effective at delivering
access to targeted audiences coveted by firms. This point is made clear in numerous academic
studies and by the greater than 70% allocation of the total sponsorship market to sport sponsorships
stated above (Preuss 2004; Quester & Farrelly 2006; Ladousse, 2009).
Prior research has documented sponsorships as co-marketing alliances (Farrelly & Quester,
2005) and noted their strategic importance (Demir & Soderman, 2015). This research has primarily
stated that for these alliances to be effective both the sponsoring firm and the sponsored entity
must establish a deep commitment that relies on “strategic compatibility, goal convergence,
commitment, and satisfaction” (Farrelly & Quester, 2005, p.55). This has led sponsors to establish
alliances which take advantage of specific marketing channels. For example, in a case study by
Ladousse (2009), the author explored Chinese computer manufacturer Lenovo and its sport
sponsorship relationships with both the International Olympic Committee and Formula One
Racing. Focusing on how the computer firm gained a competitive advantage over its rivals, Lenovo
determined “its unique identity as a ‘new world company’, with a distinctive, 21st century approach
to its business and its customers” allowed it to gain a competitive advantage over rival
manufacturers (p.200). These sponsorships allowed Lenovo to highlight its “worldsourcing”
business strategy on a global stage.
5
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One marketing channel that can bring increased exposure to sponsors is the sponsorship of
high-profile sport entities. An early event study analyzing sponsorship of professional sport arenas
and the Olympic Games found a positive impact on sponsors’ firm value (Mishra, Bobinski, &
Bhabra, 1997). Studies by Mizyazaki and Morgan (2001) and Farrell and Frame (1997) both
examined the impact of sponsorships involving the 1996 Summer Olympics in the United States
and found opposite results. Mizyazaki and Morgan (2001) attributed sponsorships to an increase
in sponsor firm value while Farrell and Frame (1997) found the relation to be negative. Berman,
Brooks, and Davidson (2000) found no significant effect on the overall Australian stock market
upon the announcement that Sydney would host the 2000 Olympics. Meanwhile, Cornwell et al.
(2005) found a positive relation between announcements of “official product” sponsorships
associated with the five primary professional sports leagues in the United States (i.e. NFL, NBA,
NHL, PGA, and MLB) and sponsor firm value. However, Clark et al. (2009) analyzed title event
sponsorship announcements associated with professional tennis tournaments, NASCAR races, and
US college football bowl games and found no significant effect on sponsor firm values.
In general, the findings of studies analyzing the impact of sport-related sponsorships on
sponsor firm value are mixed. This is no different for more recent studies (Bouchet et al., 2015;
2017). An explanation for these mixed results is currently lacking in the literature and a comparison
across these studies is difficult considering the firm value impact of sponsorships involving
individual clubs and athletes, title events, and sports leagues may not be comparable as they may
constitute sufficiently different types of sponsorships. In this study, we examine the implications
of sport sponsorship on firm value from a previously unexamined perspective in an attempt to
provide a better understanding of the relationship. We utilize a unique data set that allows us to
categorize a sample of sponsorships of the same sport entity type into two distinct groups. More
6
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importantly, we argue these two types of sponsorship may in fact result in differing effects on
sponsor firm value, helping to explain why mixed results in the extant literature exist.
Winner’s Curse
Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971) are credited with originating the winner’s curse theory
while studying the firm value implications of oil lease auctions on the companies winning the
auctions. Prior to the study, there was confusion as to why oil companies generally experienced
low equity returns (i.e. the financial markets reacted unfavorably to the acquisition of the oil lease)
following acquisitions in oil lease auctions. The authors argued that the lower than expected returns
were a rational outcome of the form of bidding process inherent to these oil lease acquisitions. In
explaining the rationale for this outcome, the authors point out that all firms bidding for these oil
leases should reasonably receive the same value from the asset, constituting a form of auction
known as a common value auction (Kagel & Levin, 1986). Under this scenario, since each bidder
forms its own estimate of the asset’s intrinsic value, the eventual winner of the bidding process is
likely to be the bidder with the highest intrinsic value estimate. Given the difficulty in estimating
the intrinsic value of the asset, there will be inherent variance in the bidders’ estimates. As such,
some bidders are likely to overestimate the intrinsic value of the asset, even if firms build in some
room for error in their bids. Thus, there exists a reasonable probability that the winner of the bid
will overpay for the asset. This adverse selection leads to what is termed the winner’s curse, as the
winning bidder is likely to be perceived as having overpaid for the asset (Kagel & Levin, 1986).
While the winner’s curse concept was developed to better understand outcomes in oil lease
auctions, it has been shown to have wide applicability across a number of situations across
disciplines. For example, prior studies examine the potential for winner’s curse in eBay auctions
(Bajari & Hortaçsu, 2003), art auctions (Goetzmann & Spiegel, 1996), and in the baseball free
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agency market (Cassing and Douglas, 1980). There have been a number of studies within the
finance discipline that study the existence of winner’s curse and its impacts on corporate takeovers
(Varaiya & Ferris, 1987; Boone & Mulherin, 2008), bank lending (Von Thadden, 2004), and initial
public offerings (Keloharju, 1993; Levis, 1990).
Given that different types of sport sponsorships may result in differences in the nature of
the bidding process for such sponsorships, the winner’s curse theory may help explain why prior
studies have found sport sponsorships to be value-enhancing, value-neutral, and value-destroying.
While such a finding would help to better understand the value dynamics of sport sponsorships, it
would also serve to extend the findings of the literature on winner’s curse by applying it to the
bidding process for sport sponsorships.
Hypotheses Development
Our analysis focuses on sponsorships between leading professional football (referred to as
soccer in the United States) clubs and their sponsors. This is a particularly interesting sport
sponsorship market to study as the sponsorship of professional football clubs is one of the highest
grossing sport sponsorship markets globally, and it is the highest grossing sport sponsorship
market in Europe (Richter, 2020). Specifically, the sport sponsorships we analyze include the
sponsoring of club kits (the brand of the shirts, shorts, and socks worn by the club) and corporate
logo sponsorships on the jersey itself (typically a large logo on the players’ chests). We will refer
to the former as “kit sponsorships” and the latter as “shirt sponsorships”. As will be explained
below, we argue that kit sponsorships represent a common value auction and are subject to
winner’s curse. On the other hand, shirt sponsorships do not represent a common value auction
and are, therefore, not subject to winner’s curse. Given the distinction between these two types of
sponsorship, one should expect these sponsorships to have different firm value implications for
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the sponsoring entity. We believe this key distinction (the form of competition inherent to the
bidding for the sponsorship) may be an important factor in determining the firm value implications
of the sponsorship that has been previously ignored in the literature. Also of importance is the fact
that these distinct sponsorships involve the same sport entity; thus, unlike in the prior literature,
the sample allows for a like-for-like comparison of the firm value implications of kit and shirt
sponsorships.
Consider companies like Nike and Adidas that compete fiercely for the privilege of
sponsoring clubs’ kits. The auction for this type of sponsorship represents a common value auction.
First, consider that the value of the sponsorship to any sponsor would be unknown at the time of
the auction. Second, the value of the sponsorship to prospective sponsors would be similar as the
increased visibility and apparel sales generated from the sponsorship is largely independent of the
sponsor itself. That is, whether Nike or Adidas is the kit sponsor, each prospective sponsor can
expect similar visibility enhancement from the kit sponsorship. Likewise, apparel sales are
unlikely to be different for one prospective sponsor relative to another as fans are buying the
apparel because of their fandom for the sport entity as opposed to their desire to own Nike or
Adidas apparel.
It is also important to note that the only prospective sponsors for these sponsorships are
those companies that compete in the sports apparel business. These prospective sponsors are
competing for limited, valuable marketing space as there is a limited market for kit sponsorships
of elite professional football clubs. Thus, this sponsorship marketing space represents a zero-sum
game with the apparel company securing the sponsorship securing a direct competitive advantage
over its peers (see, e.g., Bouchet et al., 2017). Given the fierce nature of the bidding process in
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these common value auctions, one can reasonably conclude that these sponsorships will be prone
to winner’s curse.
On the other hand, shirt sponsorships do not constitute a common value auction. To
understand this, consider that the sponsors in this marketing space are not typically involved in the
sports marketplace. The corporate sponsor is simply leveraging its association with a reputable
brand to gain brand awareness for itself. Thus, the value one prospective sponsor places on this
sponsorship opportunity is mostly independent from the value assigned by other prospective
sponsors as their strategic objectives are likely to be mutually exclusive.
Take the Chevrolet example once again. Chevrolet sponsored an English football club with
the specific strategic objective of penetrating the Southeast Asia market by aligning its brand with
that of Manchester United, a football club that enjoys a strong following in this region (Automotive
News, 2014). The value of this specific sponsorship opportunity was presumably highest for
Chevrolet as it won the bid, and that value was directly tied to its efforts to increase brand
awareness and sales in Southeast Asia. From this example, we see that the value Chevrolet
envisioned from this sponsorship opportunity is quite specific and largely independent of other
prospective sponsors. Thus, while it is still true that the highest bid will win a corporate logo
sponsorship, the highest bid in this scenario is not necessarily going to be higher than the intrinsic
value of the sponsorship to that particular sponsor. As shirt sponsorships do not constitute a
common value auction, we can reasonably conclude that the bidding process will be less prone to
winner’s curse than that of kit sponsorships.
We utilize the event study methodology to examine the implications of kit sponsorships
and shirt sponsorships. This methodology utilizes the reaction of the financial equity market to the
announcement of an event to directly measure whether the market views the impact on the firm’s
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value as positive, negative, or neutral. Having an established method for evaluating the sponsorfirm value implications of kit and shirt sponsorships, we now state our formal hypotheses.
We have argued that the bidding process for kit sponsorships constitutes a common value
auction and is prone to winner’s curse. If accurate, the winning bidders of kit sponsorships will be
viewed by the market as having overpaid for the sponsorship, on average. Thus, we propose the
following hypothesis:
H1: The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for kit sponsorship announcements
will be negative.
We have also argued that shirt sponsorships do not constitute common value auctions and are not
prone to winner’s curse. This implies that there is no reason to suspect corporate sponsors overpay
(or underpay) for shirt sponsorships. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2: The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for shirt sponsorship
announcements will be zero.
From H1 and H2, we can infer that kit sponsorships will be viewed less favorably by the market
relative to shirt sponsorships because of the existence of winner’s curse in the bidding process for
kit sponsorships but not for shirt sponsorships. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: The difference in the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for kit sponsorship
announcements and shirt sponsorship announcements will be negative.
Due to the arguably far greater value proposition of sponsoring the most high-profile clubs, we
posit these sponsorship opportunities may lead to a more competitive and frenzied bidding process
for a common value auction. As such, the variance of prospective sponsors’ intrinsic value
estimates of these sponsorships may be greater, resulting in a higher likelihood of overpaying (and
possibly overpaying by more). We propose the following hypothesis as an extension of H3:
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H4: The difference in the CAAR for kit sponsorship announcements and shirt sponsorship
announcements will be negative and greater in magnitude when the sponsorship
entails clubs from elite leagues relative to clubs from non-elite leagues.
Data Collection and Sample Construction
To identify our kit and shirt sponsorship samples, we searched online newswires to identify
instances where publicly traded firms had entered in to these sponsorships with clubs. As the event
date is of utmost importance to the accuracy of an event study, significant attention was paid to
capturing the first public announcement of the sponsorship agreement. LexisNexis was used to
simultaneously search thousands of publications to give us the highest probability of capturing the
earliest details of an impending sponsorship agreement. Web searches were then used to verify no
earlier date of an announcement could be found.
It is important to note that our sample population consists of two separate but distinct
groups of football clubs. The first data set was collected from men’s national football clubs that
played or qualified for the 2014 Federation Internationale of Association Football (FIFA) World
Cup. FIFA serves as the international governing body of association football and hosts the men’s
and women’s World Cup tournament as well as numerous other tournaments around the world.
Our second data set was collected from football clubs in FIFA’s three strongest confederations as
determined by the football governing body, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA),
Confederation of South American (CONMEBOL), and Confederation of North, Central America
and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF). Clubs in these three confederations have won
all of the major international football competitions and represent the most valuable clubs in the
world (Forbes, 2014).
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We were able to identify 388 such events with kit sponsorships representing 213
observations and shirt sponsorships representing 175 observations. It is important to note that this
is a sizable sample compared to prior studies on the firm value implications of sport sponsorships.
As an example, Cornwell et al.’s (2005) paper analyzing “official product” sponsorships used 53
sponsors and Clark et al.’s (2009) paper analyzed 114 title sponsorship announcements. Therefore,
while breaking our sample into sub-groups based on kit and shirt sponsorships reduces our sample
size, it still results in sub-samples larger in size than the full sample of many prior studies. Specific
data collected from the news releases consists of club name, league, sponsoring firm, stock
exchange, ticker symbol, country of origin for both the club and firm, and the date of
announcement.
Variables of interest to the analysis and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.
EliteLeague is a dummy variable equal to one if the football club being sponsored is a member of
the English Premier League, Spanish La Liga, German Bundesliga, or Italian Serie A5. Just over
half of the observations in our sample feature a football club from one of the four elite leagues.
The average sponsoring firm in our sample has a market capitalization of $165.26 billion.
However, large firms such as Microsoft and LG result in a large standard deviation in firm size.
The variable RelativeGDP represents the log of one plus the ratio of the per capita GDP for the
sponsoring company’s country to the per capita GDP of the football club’s country. This variable
captures any impact resulting from the relative size of the markets in which the two parties are
located.
PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Methodology

5

For sake of robustness, results have also been calculated including the French Ligue 1 as a fifth league in the
definition of EliteLeague. The results were materially unchanged.
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The event study methodology has been the preferred method for studying the impact of
significant events on firm value since its introduction by Fama et al. (1969). It continues to be used
across business disciplines including marketing (Kim and McAlister, 2011), management (Bergh
and Gibbons, 2011), finance (Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2011; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011),
and accounting (Badertscher, Hribar, and Jenkins, 2011; Horton and Serafeim, 2010). There is also
a strong precedent for using this methodology in the literature studying the effect of sport
sponsorships on firm value (Bouchet et al., 2015; Clark et al., 2009; Cornwell et al., 2005).
A popular event study method is the market model, including its advancements. First, given
the general return in the stock market on the day of the event (i.e. a measure of macroeconomic
news), we must estimate what the return on the firm’s stock would have been absent the event.
Next, an abnormal return on the stock can be calculated as the difference between the realized
return on the stock and the estimated expected return assuming the event had not occurred. Thus,
the abnormal return attempts to capture the change in firm value attributable to the event.
Within the event study framework, daily abnormal returns are calculated within an event
window around the event for which the study is attempting to identify the stock price impact. In
this study the event date (i.e. t = 0) is the date of the formal announcement that the sponsoring firm
and the club have entered into a sponsorship agreement. By measuring abnormal returns over an
event window rather than simply on the event date, we can account for the potential leakage of
information leading up to the formal announcement, as well as the potential that the price by the
end of day t = 0 does not fully reflect the impact of the event (Mackinlay, 1997).
The typical approach to estimating the sensitivity of a firm’s returns to the market index is
to run a time-series regression of the firm’s stock returns on the market index returns. Given that
our dataset includes firms with primary listings in multiple countries, the broad market index of
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the country where the sponsoring firm is listed is used as the benchmark market index for that
sample observation. The regression uses daily return data starting approximately one year prior to
the event (t = -252) and ending approximately two months prior to the event (t = -46) to safely
avoid any contamination from the event window on the estimated model parameters. The market
model is estimated as follows:
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1),
where Ri,t is the return on stock i on day t and Rm,t is the return on the market index on day t.
An expected return for day t during the event window can then be calculated by adding the
intercept from the market model to the product of the beta coefficient from the market model and
the return on the market index on day t. The abnormal return (ARi,t) of stock i on day t during the
event window is then calculated as follows:
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 ) (2),
where Ri,t is the return on stock i on day t during the event window and Rm,t is the return on the
market index on day t during the event window.
It is important to note that we employ the commonly used Scholes-Williams market model
(Scholes & Williams, 1977), an advancement on the simple market model. An advantage of this
model is that it accounts for non-synchronous trading. This is important to our study as our sample
contains stocks across multiple exchanges, with the inclusion of some relatively small firms that
may be thinly traded. The Scholes-Williams market model has also been commonly accepted for
use in sport sponsorship event studies in the prior literature (Clark et al., 2009; 2013; Cornwell et
al., 2005; Fizel and McNeil, 2015; Pruitt et al., 2004).
Similar to the simple market model, the Scholes-Williams method first estimates
parameters during a pre-event window estimation period. However, in addition to the beta
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coefficient estimated in the simple market model, the Scholes-Williams method calculates a lead
(utilizing market returns one day ahead of the stock’s return in the estimation window) and a lag
beta coefficient (utilizing the market returns one day prior to the stock’s returns in the estimation
window). The beta for the slope coefficient for stock i is then calculated as:
𝛽̂𝑖 =

̂ − +𝛽
̂𝑖 +𝛽
̂+
𝛽
𝑖
𝑖
̂𝑚
1+2𝜌

(3)

where 𝜌̂𝑚 is the autocorrelation of the market return over the estimation window. The beta
calculated using the above equation replaces the beta from the simple market model. The alpha for
the Scholes-Williams method is also calculated differently:
𝛼̂𝑖 = 𝑅̅𝑖 − 𝛽̂𝑖 ∗ 𝑅̅𝑚 (4)
where 𝑅̅𝑖 is the mean stock return over the estimation period and 𝑅̅𝑚 is the mean market return
over the estimation period. As with the simple market model, the Scholes-Williams beta and alpha
are used to calculate a firm’s expected return on day t during the event window given the observed
market return on day t. The firm’s daily abnormal return is then calculated as the difference
between the observed return and the expected return calculated by the Scholes-Williams market
model:
̂ 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼̂𝑖 + 𝛽̂𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 ) (5).
𝐴𝑅
Once the abnormal return for each day in the event window has been calculated, the
cumulative abnormal return for each firm in the sample can be calculated. The cumulative
abnormal return captures the market’s consensus estimate of the economic impact of the event on
the firm over the event window. It is calculated as follows:
̂ 𝑖,𝑡 (6)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝐴𝑅
̂ 𝑖,𝑡 is the
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over the event window and 𝐴𝑅
Scholes-Williams market model abnormal return for stock i on day t during the event window. The
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cumulative abnormal returns are then averaged across all firms in the sample to generate the
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) in the sample:
1

𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 𝑁 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (7).
Finally, throughout this study we present four separate event windows; however, we
emphasize the event window spanning the day prior to the event date (i.e. t = -1) through the day
following the event date (i.e. t = 1). By using t = -1 to t = 1, we capture the impact immediately
surrounding the announcement of the event. This helps to minimize the potential impact on share
value of other corporate announcements that may take place around the time of the sponsorship
announcement. While it increases the likelihood of contaminating the announcement effect of
interest with confounding corporate (or even macroeconomic) events, a longer event window is
also utilized in the prior literature to capture potential leakage (i.e. rumors of the sponsorship deal
ahead of the announcement) or a delayed reaction. For completeness, we present three additional
event windows in the following analysis as well.
Empirical Results
Table 2 presents CAARs for four event windows for the full sample of sponsorship
announcements (i.e. it does not differentiate between kit and shirt sponsorships). The CAAR across
each window is negative, with the (-3, 3) window achieving statistical significance at the 95%
confidence level. A lack of statistical significance for the other event windows suggest the
sponsorships, on average, are viewed by the market as being fairly priced according to these
windows (i.e. the abnormal return, on average, is equal to zero). In other words, sponsors are
acquiring these sponsorships at market clearing prices (similar to findings by Clark et al., 2009).
The Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test can be useful when making inferences from means of relatively
small sample sizes as it is not as prone to large standard errors that can result from small samples.
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These tests in Table 2 show that there are statistically significantly more negative than positive
CARs for the windows (-2, 2), (-3, 3), and (-5, 5). Thus, the results in Table 2 provide some
evidence that, on average, market reactions to kit and shirt sponsorships are negative.
PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The results in Table 2 ignore the potentially important differences between kit sponsorships
and shirt sponsorships previously discussed. If the market views these sponsorships to have
differing effects on firm value, then the aggregation of the results will hide this important
characteristic of the data. Table 3 separates the sample into kit and shirt sponsorships. Recall, from
H1, that if the bidding process for kit sponsorships constitutes a common value auction and is
prone to winner’s curse, the winning bidders are likely to be viewed by the market as having
overpaid for these sponsorships, on average. Thus, if H1 holds, then we expect the CAAR for kit
sponsorships to be negative. The results of Table 3 demonstrate that the CAARs are negative and
economically significant for kit sponsorships across all event windows, ranging from -0.73% to 0.35%. Despite the smaller sample size relative to the full sample, the negative CAARs over the
event windows (-1, 1) and (-3, 3) are also statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
According to the Wilcoxon Sign Rank Tests, there are significantly more negative CARs than
positive in the kit sponsorship sample. The test statistics for these tests suggest statistical
significance at the 95% or 99% level for all event windows. Thus, in six of the eight tests in Table
3 for kit sponsorships, statistical inference suggests the market, on average, reacts negatively to
these types of sport sponsorships. These findings provide evidence to support H1.
PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Recall that we argued the bidding process for shirt sponsorships does not constitute a
common value auction and is, therefore, not prone to winner’s curse. Looking at the shirt
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sponsorship sample in Table 3, we see that the CAARs across the event windows range from
0.31% to -0.12% and none are statistically significant. The one CAAR that is economically
significant also happens to be positive, rather than negative. Finally, none of the Wilcoxon Sign
Rank Tests show statistical significance. These findings provide no evidence to suggest the bidding
process for shirt sponsorships is impacted by winner’s curse in the way that kit sponsorships appear
to be. The results in Table 3 for shirt sponsorships support H2.
We can infer from our first two hypotheses that the CAAR for kit sponsorships might
reasonably be significantly lower than that for shirt sponsorships, motivating H3. Comparing the
means of the two subsamples, the difference in CAARs between kit sponsorships and shirt
sponsorships are consistently negative. The mean difference for the event window immediately
surrounding (-1, 1) the sponsorship announcements is statistically and economically significant at
-0.76%. While the differences in means for the other three event windows are not statistically
significant, the differences are economically significant in each case, ranging from -0.26% to 0.61%. However, without statistically reliable estimates of these means, we cannot make any
inferences based on these event windows. As H3 relies on mean difference tests alone for statistical
inference, the relatively small sample sizes (and resulting large standard errors) make it difficult
to argue the evidence strongly supports H3. But when taking the strong support for H1 and H2 into
account, along with the evidence of economically significant differences in means, there is
arguably some support for the finding that kit and shirt sponsorships are valued differently by the
market. Importantly, the results strongly support the argument that the market reaction to kit
sponsorships is consistent with the notion that these sponsorships are common value auctions and
suffer from the resulting winner’s curse. Thus, this new finding in the context of sport sponsorships
compliments and extends the literatures on both the value of sport sponsorships and winner’s curse.
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Table 4 further breaks the sample down by focusing not only on kit and shirt sponsorships
separately, but also by examining sponsorships in the most influential professional leagues. The
reason we single out the most influential leagues is that the direct pecuniary benefits from jersey
sales will be more significant for these clubs as will be the indirect benefits of greater brand
exposure. From a common value auction (i.e. kit sponsorship) perspective, the competition for
these deals will presumably be the greatest and may cause greater variance in the bids from
prospective sponsors. This would increase the likelihood of prospective sponsors overvaluing the
intrinsic value of these deals, and possibly overvaluing the deals by a greater magnitude. The same
cannot necessarily be argued for non-common value auctions (i.e. shirt sponsorships) as the value
is specific to each prospective sponsor. Thus, H4 hypothesizes that the difference in the market
reaction to kit and shirt sponsorships may be more extreme for sponsorships of elite clubs than the
difference in the unconditional samples.
PLACE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Similar to Table 3, Table 4 demonstrates that shirt sponsorships are generally met with a
negative and economically significant market reaction. Furthermore, the coefficients are
consistently more negative across all event windows for shirt sponsorships when focusing on the
most valuable sponsorships (those in the top leagues). All event windows imply losses in market
value of at least 0.67%, with the return being close to -1% for the (-3, 3) window. The (-2, 2) and
(3, 3) windows are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and the (-1, 1) window is
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The Wilcoxon Sign Rank Tests demonstrate
that the observations are significantly skewed towards negative CARs with greater than 95%
confidence in all windows. On the other hand, abnormal returns around announcements of shirt
sponsorships with clubs from the most recognizable leagues are indeed received in a more positive
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manner by shareholders than kit sponsorships. In fact, despite the even smaller size of this
subsample, the CAAR from the (-1, 1) event window is statistically significant and, at 0.60%, it is
also economically significant. However, the means of the other three event windows are
indistinguishable from zero, suggesting these deals are secured at market clearing prices. The
Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test for each event window is also statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, the differences in means across the two subsamples are even more
economically significant than in Table 3, as H4 predicts. For three of the event windows, the mean
market reaction to kit sponsorships is over 1% lower compared to shirt sponsorships, with the
mean difference being statistically significant at the 99% confidence level for the window (-1, 1)
and at the 90% confidence level for the (-2, 2) and (-3, 3) windows. The final event window, (-5,
5), is also just shy of the 90% confidence threshold. These results provide further evidence of the
important differences in the firm value implications between kit and shirt sponsorships and provide
strong evidence to support H4. Additionally, it is important to note that these results provide
support for H3 as well. The market reactions to kit sponsorships are indeed consistent with what
would be expected from a common value auction while the reactions to shirt sponsorships are
consistent with what would be expected from non-common value auctions. Thus, our findings shed
light on the variance in the findings of prior studies. In analyzing the firm value implications of
sport sponsorships in future studies, one must consider whether or not the auctions for the
sponsorships studied represent common value auctions.
Table 5 provides the results of regression analyses controlling for sponsorship type (i.e. kit
versus shirt sponsorships), as well as for sponsorships in the most influential professional leagues
(EliteLeague) and the relative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the two countries in which the
company and club are headquartered (RelativeGDP). Column (1) simply revisits the findings from
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Table 3 that shareholders view kit sponsorships less favorably than shirt sponsorships. The
coefficient on the Kit Sponsors dummy variable is the difference in means between the two
subsamples (-0.76%) while the constant represents the CAAR for shirt sponsorships (0.31%). The
impact is, again, statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Column (2) adds the
EliteLeague dummy variable. The coefficient on EliteLeague captures the impact of EliteLeague
in the overall sample, as opposed to capturing its effect on kit sponsorships relative to shirt
sponsorships. Not surprisingly then, its coefficient is not statistically significant. We will revisit
the impact of EliteLeague in Table 6. First, from Column (3) in Table 5, the coefficient on
RelativeGDP is also not statistically significant. The finding that shareholders view kit
sponsorships less favorably than shirt sponsorships maintains significance at the 95% confidence
level across all three regressions.
PLACE TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Finally, Table 6 presents the results of regressions ran on the kit and shirt sponsorship
subsamples involving teams in the top four leagues to isolate the impact of EliteLeague. It appears
that the impacts of the EliteLeague and RelativeGDP variables are opposite depending on the type
of sponsorship, providing further evidence of the need to distinguish between the types of
sponsorship when evaluating them. Sponsorships of clubs in the most prominent leagues are
viewed positively for shirt sponsorships, but negatively for kit sponsorships. The negative impact
for kit sponsorships is consistent with these sponsorships being valued in a manner consistent with
the bidding process taking the form of a common value auction. Finally, in the kit sponsorship
subsample, the impact of RelativeGDP is negative and, this time, statistically significant. This
implies that when the sponsor of a kit is headquartered in a country that is large relative to the
country the club is located in, the returns to the sponsorships are less favorable.

22

A Dichotomy of Sport Sponsorships

PLACE TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Discussion
The results of our empirical analysis are in fact consistent with our predictions that the firm
value implications of kit and shirt sponsorships are different because of the important difference
in the bidding process for each type of sponsorship. Specifically, kit sponsorships are common
value auctions and are expected to be prone to winner’s curse while shirt sponsorships are not. Our
findings provide strong evidence to support this view. Kit sponsorships are perceived by the market
as being value-decreasing while shirt sponsorships are perceived by the market as being mostly
value-neutral. We also provide evidence that kit sponsorships are perceived to create significantly
less value than shirt sponsorships, especially when analyzing sponsorships involving elite clubs.
The primary motivation of this study was to provide some clarity on why studies in the
prior literature have found sport sponsorships to be value decreasing, value enhancing, and valueneutral. For instance, we previously mentioned that Mishra, Bobinski, and Bhabra (1997) and
Mizyazaki and Morgan (2001) found corporate sponsorships of the Olympic Games to be value
enhancing while Farrell and Frame (1997) found evidence that they are value destroying. As
corporate sponsorships of the Olympic Games would constitute non-common value auctions
(similar to shirt sponsorships in our sample), we would predict results that more align with the
findings of Mishra, Bobinski, and Bhabra (1997) and Mizyazaki and Morgan (2001). We also
mentioned the official product sponsorships associated with the five primary professional sports
leagues in the United States studied by Cornwell et al. (2005) and the title event sponsorship
announcements associated with professional tennis tournaments, NASCAR races, and US college
football bowl games studied by Clark et al. (2009). These studies found the sponsorships to be
value enhancing and value-neutral, respectively. Despite the difference in findings, these
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sponsorships involve non-common value auctions and the results are consistent with what one
might predict.
One point we would like to make is that for a sufficiently large sample of non-common
value auctions in a competitive market, the expectation might reasonably be that the sponsorships
are acquired at market clearing prices (i.e. the sponsorships are value neutral), on average. In other
words, it is not clear why the winning bidders in a sample would be able to outbid other prospective
sponsors while also consistently undervaluing the intrinsic value of the sponsorship to the firm. Is
it possible bidders in non-common value auctions recognize the bidding dynamics and, thus, are
more conservative with their estimates and bids? We suppose this is possible. For similar reasons,
it is not clear why some (albeit much fewer) studies of non-common value auctions in the sport
sponsorship literature have found the firm value implications to be negative. In fact, this scenario
is arguably more difficult to understand as non-common value auctions are clearly not prone to
winner’s curse to the same degree as common value auctions.
One explanation we put forth here is that the competitive nature of the bidding process may
shed some light on this line of inquiry. If the competitive bidding process for particular types of
non-common value auctions is quite intense, then the prospective bidders may be more aggressive
in their valuing of the sponsorship leading to bids being higher, on average. This could result in a
negative CAAR for these sponsorships. As competition for sponsorships of the Olympic Games
might constitute this type of competition, this may explain the variance in results for the event
studies referenced above. On the other hand, if competition in the bidding process is relatively
weak, then prospective bidders may be more conservative in their intrinsic values estimates,
leading to sponsorships being acquired at more favorable prices. This may very well constitute a
rich area for future research.
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Notably, while studies analyzing the firm value implications of common value auctions are
prevalent in other disciplines, it is not prevalent in the sport sponsorship literature. This may not
be surprising as kit sponsorships of football clubs likely represent the largest market for such
sponsorships at the current time. One reason for this is the immense global appeal of the sport.
Another reason is that some professional sports leagues sell the “official uniform” rights to a single
sponsor (e.g. the major professional sports leagues in the United States). This landscape is
changing however. For instance, the National Basketball Association was the first professional
sports league in the United States to begin selling corporate logo sponsorships on team jerseys,
beginning the practice in 2017 (Garcia, 2016). League executives stated the difficulty in continuing
to ignore this substantial revenue source. It is likely only a matter of time before other professional
sports leagues follow suit.
The same can be imagined for official uniform sponsorships. Teams will find it
increasingly difficult to continue to ignore how valuable negotiating their own deals with apparel
companies can be. It may only be a matter of time before team executives pressure leagues to
permit this type of sponsorship. For example, one might imagine that a globally valuable brand
like the New York Yankees of Major League Baseball in the United States could negotiate terms
of an official jersey sponsorship that is more lucrative than the revenue the organization must share
with other teams through the league’s single sponsorship. NCAA Division I football programs can
already strike deals with apparel companies of their choosing for uniform sponsorship rights. Of
course, there are also other contexts in which common value sponsorships come into play with
sport sponsorships. One example would be official tire sponsorships of racing cars in NASCAR.
As common value auction sport sponsorships become more prevalent, there will be a growing
opportunity for future research in this area.
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Managerial Implications
In addition to academic relevance, this paper contains important managerial information
for both club personnel and firm executives that engage in sport sponsorships. While there has
been a plethora of studies regarding sport sponsorships, this paper explores categorizing
sponsorships based on the nature of the bidding process for different types of sport sponsorships.
On one hand, corporations such as Nike and Adidas continue to compete fiercely for sponsorships
with professional football clubs despite the stock market’s response to these deals being negative,
on average. However, when considering the market for these sponsorships is particularly
susceptible to a winner’s curse, a valid theoretical explanation for this otherwise puzzling
empirical finding becomes clear. While corporations attempting to acquire sport sponsorships
through common value auctions should certainly attempt to get the best price possible, it is
important to understand overpayment in the eyes of shareholders may be inevitable, especially
when attempting to acquire the most highly coveted sponsorships. In the case of kit sponsorships
in this study, the zero-sum game nature of this marketing channel would result in substantial value
capture for some firms if others simply relent and exit this sponsorship space. Thus, continuing to
participate in these auctions would seem to be rational.
On the other hand, corporate sponsors looking to expand their brand’s presence both locally
and internationally should strongly consider sport sponsorships, such as corporate logo
sponsorships in professional football leagues. Importantly, as the value proposition of these deals
is much more specific to the sponsor itself compared to kit sponsorships, a winner’s curse is much
less of an issue allowing sponsors to potentially capture greater value from these deals.
With over 70% of total marketing sponsorship dollars flowing to sport sponsorships, firms
have spoken clearly that the value proposition from sponsoring sport entities, sporting events, and
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professional athletes is substantial. And there is no reason to believe this trend will decline in the
future. Nonetheless, it is important from an academic and industry perspective to better understand
the firm value implications of such sponsorships. Our study contributes to this understanding by
being the first to consider the nature of the bidding process for sport sponsorships and applying
the findings from the winner’s curse literature to the literature on sport sponsorships. Our findings
also open up rich areas for future research in this area.
Recommendations for Future Research and Limitations
As detailed earlier, the dichotomy of sport sponsorships described here and our results shed
light on somewhat mixed results in the prior literature examining the value of sport sponsorships
to sponsors. Sponsorships of the Olympic Games are numerous and the bidding process for these
sponsorships would represent non-common value auctions, as would official product and title
event sponsorships in major professional sports leagues. Hence, the general finding of either a
positive or neutral impact on sponsor value is consistent with our findings for shirt sponsorships.
However, as stated before, there is still room for future research in this area. While finding positive
impacts of sport sponsorships that are acquired through non-common value auctions is not
necessarily inconsistent with expectations, it would imply that firms are systematically outbidding
other prospective bidders while also undervaluing the intrinsic value of the sponsorship to the
firms. It is not abundantly clear why this would be the case. A more nuanced analysis of the
competitive nature of the bidding process for such sponsorships may shed further light on this
issue and, thus, opens up a potentially valuable area for future research.
Studies analyzing sponsorships that would be considered common value auctions are not
as common in sport sponsorship literature. However, this provides a fertile area of exploration for
future studies in this literature. For instance, extreme competition between major athletic shoe
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brands for endorsement deals with star-level NBA basketball players would be a prime example
of common value auctions. Indeed, apparel brand endorsement deals with individual athletes are
becoming increasingly common. More closely tied to our sample, NCAA Division I athletic
programs are now permitted to negotiate sponsorship deals with apparel companies in the same
way professional football clubs negotiate kit deals. Analysis of these or similar sponsorships could
provide further evidence to support the important distinctions we draw between sport sponsorships
involving common and non-common value auctions.
As with prior studies examining the shareholder value implications of sport sponsorship,
the size of our sample limits the likelihood of strong statistical significance. While our sample is
substantially larger than those in many previous studies, this limitation still holds. Furthermore,
the necessity to divide our sample into kit and shirt sponsorships to test our hypotheses results in
subsamples that exacerbate this concern. An additional limitation of our study is the focus on one
sport. While this allows for a clean comparison between common and non-common value auctions
for sport sponsorships, it does not provide direct evidence that the results are generalizable. Our
results are also found in the context of highly visible, highly valuable global sport brands as we
focus on sponsorships involving the preeminent global sport – football. This suggests the need for
future research in the context of other sport-related sponsorships, allowing further investigation of
whether our findings are generalizable.
Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that shareholders differentiate between sport sponsorships
when assessing their firm value implications. This differentiation occurs because the bidding
process for some sport sponsorships represents a common value auction while others do not. As
common value auctions are prone to winner’s curse, the winning bidders of such auctions can
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expect a negative impact on firm value, on average. Winner’s curse does not apply to non-common
value auctions, so the bidding process for sponsorships that take this form of auction will have a
far less likelihood of resulting in negative firm value impacts. Thus, the important distinction
between these types of sport sponsorships may help to explain the variance in the findings on the
firm value implications of sport sponsorships in the extant literature.
The sport sponsorships we analyze include the sponsoring of leading professional football
(referred to more commonly as soccer in the United States) clubs. Specifically, the sponsorships
include the sponsoring of club kits (the brand of the shirts, shorts, and socks worn by the club) and
corporate logo sponsorships on the jerseys of these same clubs (typically a large logo on the
players’ chests). We argue that kit sponsorships represent a common value auction and are subject
to winner’s curse. On the other hand, shirt sponsorships do not represent a common value auction
and are, therefore, not subject to winner’s curse. Thus, given the distinction between these two
types of sponsorship, one should expect these sponsorships to have different firm value
implications for the sponsoring entity.
Our results indeed suggest that the market values kit and shirt sponsorships in a way that
is consistent with the dynamics of common and non-common value auctions. Kit sponsorships are
found to be met with negative reactions by sponsoring firms’ shareholders through negative
sponsor stock returns, on average, around the public announcement of the sponsorship. However,
we find that the market reaction to shirt sponsorships is neutral (sponsor stock returns around the
announcement date of the sponsorship are zero, on average), suggesting these sponsorships are
acquired at market clearing prices. We also provide evidence that the average sponsor stock returns
around the announcements of kit sponsorship deals are economically and statistically significantly
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lower than that for shirt sponsorships, especially for deals involving clubs in the top four
professional football leagues globally.
While these results are specific to our sample, the broader academic literature has
illustrated the impact common value auctions have on the firm value implications of the winning
bidders in many other contexts. Thus, it seems reasonable that our results would generalize to other
sport-related sponsorships. Nonetheless, as our study analyzes sponsorships specific to the
preeminent global professional sport, football, differentiation between types of sport sponsorships
in other sport-related contexts provides a fertile ground for additional research to shed further light
on whether the results here are generalizable. Our study is the first to make the important
distinction between common and non-common value auctions in the context of sport sponsorships
to show their impact on the firm value implications of these sponsorships. We encourage future
research to explore the topics presented and examined here in different contexts to expand our
knowledge on the topic.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable

N

EliteLeague

388

54.64%

KitSponsor

388

54.90%

FirmSize

128

$165,262

$1,194,547

$21,315

$4,165

$48,113

RelativeGDP

384

0.95

0.56

0.74

0.69

0.86

Mean

St. Dev.

35

Median

25%

75%

Percent
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Table 2
Event Study Results – Full Sample
Event Interval
-1 to 1
-2 to 2
-3 to 3
- 5 to 5

Coefficient
T-Statistics
-0.107%
(-0.68)
-0.232%
(-1.17)
-0.456%
(-1.97)
-0.162%
(-0.58)

N

# Pos : # Neg
% Positive
177/211
45.62%
168/220
43.30%
161/227
41.49%
165/223
42.53%

**

**
***
*

388

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
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Table 3
Event Study Results – Kit vs Shirt Sponsorships
Kit Sponsorships
Event Interval
-1 to 1
-2 to 2
-3 to 3
- 5 to 5
N

Coefficient
T-Statistics
-0.450%
(-2.18)
-0.347%
(-1.30)
-0.731%
(-2.37)
-0.349%
(-0.98)

Shirt Sponsorships

# Pos/# Neg
% Positive
86/127 ***
40.38%
90/123 **
42.25%
82/131 ***
38.50%
86/127 **
40.38%

**

**

Coefficient
T-Statistics

# Pos/# Neg
% Positive
91/84
52.00%
78/97
45.14%
79/96
45.14%
79/96
45.14%

0.310%
(1.288)
-0.091%
(-0.31)
-0.121%
(-0.35)
0.066%
(0.15)

213

175

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
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Difference in
Means
-0.760%
(-2.41)
-0.256%
(-0.64)
-0.610%
(-1.31)
-0.415%
(-0.74)

**
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Table 4
Event Study Results – Kit vs Shirt Sponsorships for Clubs in Elite Leagues

Event Interval
-1 to 1
-2 to 2
-3 to 3
- 5 to 5
N

Kit Sponsorships –
Elite League Only
Coefficient
# Pos/# Neg
T-Statistics
% Positive
43/73 ***
-0.719% ***
(-2.91)
37.07%
43/73 ***
-0.670% **
(-2.14)
37.07%
43/73 ***
-0.995% **
(-2.55)
37.07%
46/70 **
-0.723%
(-1.48)
39.66%
116

Shirt Sponsorships –
Elite League Only
Coefficient
# Pos/# Neg
T-Statistics
% Positive
50/46
0.600% *
(1.83)
52.08%
43/53
0.202%
(0.47)
44.79%
42/54
0.159%
(0.32)
43.75%
43/53
0.506%
(0.83)
44.79%
96

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
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Difference in
Means
-1.320%
(-3.27)
-0.872%
(-1.67)
-1.154%
(-1.84)
-1.229%
(-1.59)

***
*
*
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Table 5
Regression Analysis - CAAR of Event Window (-1, 1)
(1)
KitSponsor

-0.76%
(-2.41)

(2)
**

EliteLeague

-0.76%
(-2.41)
-0.03%
(-0.11)

RelativeGDP
Constant
R^2
Sample Size (N)

0.31%
(1.33)
0.0148
388

0.33%
(1.13)
0.0148
388

(3)
**

-0.79%
(-2.45)
-0.06%
(-0.16)
-0.24%
(-0.75)
0.54%
(1.19)
0.0202
384

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
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Table 6
Regression Analysis – CAAR of Event Study Window (-1, 1) – Kit and Shirt Sponsorships
Kit Sponsorships

EliteLeague

(1)
-0.59%
(-1.43)

RelativeGDP
Constant
R^2
Sample Size (N)

-0.13%
(-0.42)
0.0096
213

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
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Shirt Sponsorships
(2)
-0.88%
(-1.91)
-0.74%
(-2.04)
0.73%
(1.25)
0.025
209

*

(3)
0.64%
(1.33)

**
-0.04%
(-0.12)
0.0102
175

(4)
0.91%
(1.71)
0.75%
(1.19)
-0.81%
(-1.10)
0.0183
175

*

